One Less Woman on Wall Street

I was fired from Santander on Friday, March 1, 2024. "Terminated effective immediately" via video call. Don't bother coming in to clear out your desk, we'll box up your personal items and mail them to you. 

Thanks, because I have some really expensive shoes in my desk. Also, I need those programming and statistical learning books back so I can brush up on my skills while I look for another job. 

The job

I am, well I was, an investment strategist for commercial mortgage backed securities in Santander's capital markets group. This was my fifth fixed income research/strategy role over the past 20+ years. Sell side strategists do analysis and publish research that includes investment recommendations and trade ideas. We work with both sales and trading to support clients and grow the business. That's the job in a nutshell. It's far from the best paying job on Wall Street. In an industry whose only measure of success is the size of the paycheck, it's one that is often looked down on. I stuck with it because I enjoy writing, I excel at analysis as I'm a quant by training, I find trading and investment strategy interesting, and, frankly, because I was repeatedly either overlooked or blocked from trading roles until I finally gave up trying to move into one. Truthfully the job suits my personality, skills and interests.

The precipitating events

In mid January a Bloomberg reporter reached out to me about a story he was developing on Arbor Realty. Arbor had been under intense pressure for months due to deteriorating performance of their commercial real estate loan portfolio. A high profile firm issued a short seller report on Arbor, and a slew of negative press articles and reports of frantic industry conference calls had been circulating for weeks. 

The reporter was interested in some data I had published in a recent strategy piece that showed rising delinquencies - both broadly and for a couple of specific issuers - in a sector of the commercial real estate securities market. He wanted to know if I could pull the same kind of data for Arbor, and if I was willing to be quoted in the article about their performance. 

Dealing with the press is always touchy, but it's been a routine part of my job for 20+ years. Some of the most successful analysts around have built careers by courting the media, making high profile calls, or being first out with information. If you check the header of my blog, Blondes Prefer Bonds, it's a picture of me doing a TV interview, back when I was younger and better looking and covered interest rate strategy. However, when the call goes against your desk or your business, it's the third rail and you dare not touch it. Cue the ominous, foreshadowing music.

I had published identical data for two other issuers and the market as a whole in several prior publications. I was working on a report that would publish exactly that performance data for every issuer in the space. Anyone who invests in, covers or trades CMBS has access to the data via Bloomberg, Intex or Trepp. At the time, the focus of the article was supposed to be on a conference call about Arbor held by a servicer. The impression I was given was that my data would be there as support, with an attribution literally in a footnote under the chart. 

Two facts that I didn't know at the time: 

1. Santander was in the process of setting up a financing line for Arbor; and 

2. The servicer who had the conference call about Arbor later called the reporter and forced him to retract any discussion or mention of them from the story. 

The Bloomberg article, Missed Payments in Arbor Realty CLOs Soar as Landlords Struggle was published in early February. At least that was the original title, which you can see from the link. Curiously, it's since been changed to a more generic title that doesn't lead with Arbor directly. For those of you who can't read the article, Santander is very prominently featured, and I am very prominently quoted, as a source of data and commentary regarding Arbor's deteriorating performance. 

The blowback

There was drama. First, before the article was published. Then 10x more afterwards. The sickening, weekend ruining, career endangering kind of drama that makes you want to move to a trailer in Belize and study howler monkeys, because at least they would be friendlier than the local baboons.

The blow-up started immediately after I told my trading desk that I was going to be quoted in an article about Arbor, and I was made aware of fact #1. (Because, you know, trying to be honest and transparent.) While I hastily informed the reporter that he had to pull all of my quotes, the daisy chain of god only knows what eventually led to five men discussing my "mistakes" in various conference rooms, but never actually talking directly to me about any of it. The fact that this was a desk that I covered and a client relationship I was never made aware of that was integral to my job? Apparently also my fault for not including myself in meetings and conversations I had never been invited to attend. 

The article didn't come out for another week, because after fact #2 occurred, the reporter had to scramble to save the story. Unbeknownst to me, the focus of the story then became the data I had given him, and some quotes he lifted out of my previous research that were about the general market, but in the context of the article were portrayed to be about Arbor. 

To be clear, a reporter is free to use any quotes from published research, since it's already in the public domain. They don't even need to ask you. I had never published a piece about Arbor, hadn't mentioned them by name in any report. When I explained that I had to withdraw, the reporter agreed to pull all of my previous verbal quotes. To his absolute credit, he asked me if it was still ok to include the data I had pulled for him. I told him that was fine, because it was identical to the data that I had published for different issuers, and it's widely available to investors. 

The second round of bombings (of me) and meetings (about me) by the group of men (none of whom had yet really spoken to me after a week) were, predictably, much worse than the first. My boss, I am pretty sure, defended me to the teeth throughout these discussions. My biggest regret was putting him in that position again, over the same issue. 

I was told to write an email of explanation and apology to the group of men - which included my peers and superiors - none of whom besides my boss had yet had the decency to so much as ask me a question or speak to me directly about any of it. Including the trader who launched the attack on me and my work, who prior to these events I actually considered one of my closest friends on the desk. So I wrote the email. I had a second horrific weekend. I was told I was no longer trusted and the desk had lost faith in me. But we would continue to try to work it out and reestablish my relationships and position. My boss was a rock of support throughout this time. There were more meetings, finally face to face discussions that were productive, and things eased up and seemed to move forward. 

The termination

Two weeks passed. I went to an industry conference. I saw friends and colleagues, met with clients and did my job. I was truly relieved, and was consciously working towards repairing things with my desk. 

I'm not sure who called for my head. It might have been Arbor. Though it seems to have been the former president of Amherst, now the head of sales at Santander capital markets, who showed up as part of the video call to fire me. Ironically, my introduction to him was when he interviewed me for the job as head of investment strategy six years prior - the job that eventually went to my boss. Since that time, he had barely spoken to me except in passing. In my nearly six years at the firm he never once put me on a call with clients, asked me to attend a dinner or client entertainment event, or showed the slightest bit of interest in my work. Coincidentally, when I was in the first round of the shelling, he did meet with a junior trader on the desk I cover. They had a nice chat. As the young trader was leaving the office he was invited to attend a client event so the head of sales could introduce him around and give him some exposure. Just like that. Offering a leg up, another rung on the ladder to the penthouse of the boys club. 

It was weird to be fired by 4 heads on a Teams call. Following protocol, my boss was the one to tell me, but I think he did everything within his power to prevent it over the prior weeks. The head of sales was obviously agitated, but also seemed triumphant in that way bullies and cowards get when they step on someone weaker than themselves. There were two people from HR, one of whom I had never seen or spoken to before - who managed to sound snarky when he "thanked me for all my work". That cued the exec to chime in with the same remark from whatever script they were following. And then it was over. Oh yeah, and I qualify for COBRA since all my benefits are also being cut off immediately. 

The aftermath

I'm not sure where to go from here. Or where I will want to go. Or can go. The reverberations from the last few weeks have me a bit mentally and emotionally concussed. 

I owe my boss an apology for tossing him live grenades at a time when the business was barely strong enough to withstand a barrage of cap gun fire. 

Part of me doesn't want to make too much of it. There are terrible tragedies and losses in life, some of which I have watched friends and family endure. Losing a job, even a career, is not to be counted among them. But within the confines of a life, it can shake the scaffolding. 

What I do know is that when I tell a story over and over again, I tend to relive it. And I don't want to relive this one. I also don't want to be ashamed and humiliated every time someone asks me about losing my job, or whispers about it behind my back. So here's the story. Out in the open. Let's get it over with. If anyone in the future needs or wants to know why I left Wall Street, I can direct them here. 

The addendum

I wrote the above the day after I was fired. The following week - 2 business days later - Santander carried out a reduction in force (RIF), heavily concentrated in the legacy Amherst broker dealer. Those laid off were provided severance and retained their benefits for some period of time. Among those RIF'd were two women (and zero men) from the strategy group. Combined with my termination, that left one woman remaining in strategy from an original group of 10, and the next person they hired was predictably male and rumored to be the highest paid by far in the group. Within weeks of the layoffs, several high ranking men, including the aforementioned president of Amherst, abruptly retired. Careers, benefits, vested compensation and reputation intact. 

In July 2024, four months after my termination, press reports revealed that Arbor Realty was under investigation by both the DOJ and FBI for possible fraudulent loan and accounting practices. The SEC later joined the investigation. Arbor is now the target of several class action lawsuits alleging securities fraud. 

Me? I spent the past 16 months applying and interviewing for jobs in finance. Never landed anywhere and have finally given up on regaining any semblance of my former career. Eventually I may need to put my house on the market, as it's burning through my retirement savings years ahead of when I was planning to retire. I'm now exploring a few new directions because I want and need a job, though having recently turned 60 the path to meaningful reemployment is both narrow and steep. 

On the upside, finally giving up on returning to New York City has allowed me to adopt a dog: a wonderful rescue I've named Daisy, who was abandoned at a shelter by her previous owners. I took her out on a weekend getaway, then returned on Monday to adopt her. As I was filling out the paperwork, one of the staff members, who was particularly delighted and relieved, quietly informed me that she had been added to the euthanasia list that morning. Daisy and I thanked them profusely, hopped in the getaway car, and hauled ass out of there. Partners in crime till the end. 

A Guide to the Nerds of Fixed Income (part 2)

Part 2 of my post profiling the relative nerdishness of various fixed income desks. Inherently, unapologetically biased. Anyone wishing to lodge complaints, corrections or additional context can find me at Jack Coombs Field watching Duke baseball in the super regional. #BlueCollar #GoDuke

Investment grade corporate credit

Eternally grouchy, but they have good reasons for being so. A universe of primarily plain vanilla bonds that trade as a spread product to treasuries due to the added default and liquidity risk. Trading volumes and liquidity measures are much lower, while financing costs are higher. The idiosyncratic credit risk make the bonds difficult to hedge, though the rise of exchange traded credit funds has made it easier to balance broad market-based credit risk. Wedged firmly between the debt and equity underwriting groups at big shops, the internal politics can be tricky. Practitioners are expected to know as much detail about the companies they cover as equity analysts, but are discouraged from disagreeing with their typical rah rah outlook. The infantry troops of fixed income - tough, hard working, nose to the grindstone, smart enough not to lift their heads when the bullets start flying. Can exhibit inspiring cohesion when cornered. Many years ago, during a particularly brutal comp and RIF season, a group of credit traders are rumored to have shown up to a 7am morning meeting already in the bag. Then proceeded to burp and pass gas throughout the meeting, while asking a few pointed but not impertinent questions. Absolute legends. 

High yield corporate credit

The smartest group on the floor next to the vol desk, leaning more towards law and accounting than quant. The market for high yield, or junk, rated debt is smaller, less liquid, significantly more complex and volatile than that of investment grade. Deep knowledge of bankruptcy and securities law, along with an exhaustive approach to analyzing financial statements, is standard. Often attracts lawyers and very sharp MBAs who can independently value balance sheet assets, and have niche expertise in the areas they cover, such as companies with biotech patents or mineral rights. Interest rate risk is trivial compared to the credit risk, which to the best of my limited knowledge is fairly unhedgeable. Similar to vol desks, books can blow up overnight, so steady nerves and deep appetites for risk are hallmarks. If they were slicker and more extroverted they would probably end up in investment banking or private equity. Intellectually sophisticated and fair minded, they are possibly the most interesting people to talk to over drinks. But don't cross them. They and their clients will bring a gun to a knife fight. 

Structured products

Beyond the $9 trillion agency MBS market, with trading volume of nearly $300 billion per day, lies the other structured product securities markets. These markets are smaller and relatively less, to extremely less, liquid and transparent. Understanding the asset class and its economic drivers, the characteristics of the underlying loans, and the interest rate and credit dynamics of the wide variety of securities that are structured from pools of such loans is hard work. A lot of specialized work that requires deep expertise in the business that produces the loans, e.g. subprime autos or commercial real estate; the financing and underwriting of the loans into securitization; and the structuring of cashflows from the pool into the various securities of the deal. 

For better and for worse, the temperament and personality characteristics of the various structured product desks tends to mimic those of people in the loan origination business. The upside is that the securities and the businesses they support can be complex and fascinating. The downside is that, although lumped together, they tend to operate within silos more so than other areas of fixed income because each market and product is so highly specialized. Pro tip: most structured products desks are bored silly listening to the other desks' market commentary in the morning meeting. The geeking out and jargon will make your eyes glaze over. 

Asset-backed securities (ABS)

If you cover or trade asset-backed securities based on autos, credit cards or student loans, it helps to have an interest in consumer finance and perhaps personal bankruptcy law. Most ABS matures in under 3 years, though some can go out to 5 years, so secondary trading tends to be very light and risk management is getting the deal out the door. The big swingers are on desks with large underwriting businesses, typically at bulge bracket financial institutions with broker dealers and commercial banks, though some smaller banks specialize in particular market segments and those desks can be outsized drivers of that business. People who work on ABS desks can glance at you, ask where you work, then rattle off a surprisingly prescient guess of your household income, credit score and the likelihood you will default on a loan. Esoteric ABS desks know weird stuff like what people keep in those self-storage sheds outside of Poughkeepsie and how much money different medical practices make. 

Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)

Well, tra la la. Here we are. There are two flavors of CMBS: 

• Agency CMBS, which is exclusively multifamily commercial real estate loans, guaranteed by one of the government agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae). The better and chummier your relationship with the government agencies, the more deals you lead, more trading flow you can generate and clients you can bring to the table. Despite being closer to investment banking than is often comfortable, it's filled with people who are great team leaders, geeky enough to structure bespoke bonds and personable enough to sell them, and can navigate political relationships with the GSEs, the Fed and recently the FDIC. That is no small feat. Good drinking buddies all around. 
• The other flavor is non-agency CMBS and CRE CLOs, which are securities comprised of pools of stabilized and transitional commercial real estate loans, respectively, of any property type, e.g. multifamily, office, hospitality, industrial, etc. To lead CMBS deals you need a pipeline of loans and/or to provide financing to specialty lenders as loans are being pooled for a deal. If you don't lead at least the occasional deal, you are trading from the sidelines. Commercial real estate and the desks that traffic in it tend to be dominated by big deals and bigger egos. Donald Trump is not an outlier. The spectrum runs from charismatic, iconoclastic thinkers with high tolerance for risk to insecure dictators who can't abide anyone speaking out of turn, much less dissent. Watch your back. 

Closing remarks

I've been at a lot of sell side shops and worked on a variety of fixed income desks. A few things stand out to me that might be useful for people entering the business or considering a switch. 

• There is a big difference between broker dealers that are primary dealers for the Federal Reserve and everyone else. It has the biggest impact in treasuries, repo and agency MBS, but that flow and knowledge difference trickles down through other products as well. There are some clients, particularly some large international clients, who will not trade with a broker dealer that is not a primary dealer for the Fed. 
• Likewise, there is a considerable difference between shops that finance loans and are lead managers of deals or securitizations in an asset class, and those that are solely in the selling group on deals or trade strictly in the secondary market. More knowledge, more experience, greater ability and mandate to warehouse risk. Smaller desks may work harder for some client business and can be more discrete.